

## **Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.**

**287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961)**

FRIENDLY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Polaroid Corporation, a Delaware corporation, owner of the trademark Polaroid and holder of 22 United States registrations thereof granted between 1936 and 1956 and of a New York registration granted in 1950, brought this action in the Eastern District of New York, alleging that defendant's use of the name Polarad as a trademark and as part of defendant's corporate title infringed plaintiff's Federal and state trademarks and constituted unfair competition. It sought a broad injunction and an accounting. Defendant's answer, in addition to denying the allegations of the complaint, sought a declaratory judgment establishing defendant's right to use Polarad in the business in which defendant was engaged, an injunction against plaintiff's use of Polaroid in the television and electronics fields, and other relief. Judge Rayfiel, in an opinion reported in D.C. 1960, 182 F.Supp. 350, dismissed both the claim and the counterclaims, concluding that neither plaintiff nor defendant had made an adequate showing with respect to confusion and that both had been guilty of laches. Both parties appealed but defendant has withdrawn its cross-appeal. We find it unnecessary to pass upon Judge Rayfiel's conclusion that defendant's use of Polarad does not violate any of plaintiff's rights. For we agree that plaintiff's delay in proceeding against defendant bars plaintiff from relief so long as defendant's use of Polarad remains as far removed from plaintiff's primary fields of activity as it has been and still is.

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Conceding that the bulk of its business is in optics and photography, lines not pursued by defendant, plaintiff nevertheless claims to be entitled to protection of its distinctive mark in at least certain portions of the large field of electronics. Plaintiff relies on its sales of Schmidt corrector plates, used in certain types of television systems, first under government contracts beginning in 1943 and to industry commencing in 1945; on its sale, since 1946, of polarizing television filters, which serve the same function as the color filters that defendant supplies as a part of the television apparatus sold by it; and, particularly, on the research and development contracts with the government referred to above. Plaintiff relies also on certain instances of confusion, predominantly communications intended for defendant but directed to plaintiff. Against this, defendant asserts that its business is the sale of complex electronics equipment {consisting of microwave devices and television studio equipment} to a relatively few customers; that this does not compete in any significant way with plaintiff's business, the bulk of which is now in articles destined for the ultimate consumer; that plaintiff's excursions into electronics are insignificant in the light of the size of the field; that the instances of

confusion are minimal; that there is no evidence that plaintiff has suffered either through loss of customers or injury to reputation, since defendant has conducted its business with high standards; and that the very nature of defendant's business, sales to experienced industrial users and the government, precludes any substantial possibility of confusion. Defendant also asserts plaintiff's laches to be a bar.

The problem of determining how far a valid trademark shall be protected with respect to goods other than those to which its owner has applied it, has long been vexing and does not become easier of solution with the years. Neither of our recent decisions so heavily relied upon by the parties, *Harold F. Ritchie, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's, Inc.*, 2 Cir., 1960, 281 F.2d 755, by plaintiff, and *Avon Shoe Co., Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc.*, 2 Cir., 1960, 279 F.2d 607 by defendant, affords much assistance, since in the Ritchie case there was confusion as to the identical product and the defendant in the Avon case had adopted its mark 'without knowledge of the plaintiffs' prior use,' at page 611. Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of many variables: the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other variables into account. American Law Institute, Restatement of Torts, §§ 729, 730, 731. Here plaintiff's mark is a strong one and the similarity between the two names is great, but the evidence of actual confusion, when analyzed, is not impressive. The filter seems to be the only case where defendant has sold, but not manufactured, a product serving a function similar to any of plaintiff's, and plaintiff's sales of this item have been highly irregular, varying, e.g., from \$2,300 in 1953 to \$303,000 in 1955, and \$48,000 in 1956.

If defendant's sole business were the manufacture and sale of microwave equipment, we should have little difficulty in approving the District Court's conclusion that there was no such likelihood of confusion as to bring into play either the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1), or New York General Business Law, § 368-b, or to make out a case of unfair competition under New York decisional law, see *Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc.*, *supra*, at page 614, footnote 11. What gives us some pause is defendant's heavy involvement in a phase of electronics that lies closer to plaintiff's business, namely, television. Defendant makes much of the testimony of plaintiff's executive vice president that plaintiff's normal business is 'the interaction of light and matter.' Yet, although television lies predominantly in the area of electronics, it begins and ends with light waves. The record tells us that certain television uses were among the factors that first stimulated Dr. Land's interest in polarization, see *Marks v. Polaroid Corporation*, *supra*, 129 F.Supp. at

page 246, plaintiff has manufactured and sold at least two products for use in television systems, and defendant's second counterclaim itself asserts likelihood of confusion in the television field. We are thus by no means sure that, under the views with respect to trademark protection announced by this Court in such cases as *Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson*, 2 Cir., 1928, 26 F.2d 972 (locks vs. flashlights {finding confusion}); *L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon*, 2 Cir., 1934, 72 F.2d 272 (mechanical pens and pencils vs. razor blades {finding confusion}); *Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich*, 2 Cir., 1948, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (magazines vs. girdles {finding confusion}); and *Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc.*, 2 Cir., 1953, 203 F.2d 517 (radios, electric ranges and refrigerators vs. sewing machines and vacuum cleaners {finding confusion}), plaintiff would not have been entitled to at least some injunctive relief if it had moved with reasonable promptness. However, we are not required to decide this since we uphold the District Court's conclusion with respect to laches.

{The court went on to reject the plaintiff's attempts to overcome the defendant's defense of laches.}